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ABSTRACT 
Acre State in Brazil is at the forefront of efforts to institutionalize 
jurisdictional-scale policies that aim to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). Given limited REDD+ funds 
and uncertain returns from alternative land uses, this paper estimates the 
minimum incentive payment Acre’s government would have to pay forest 
landowners in each of its 22 municipalities to ensure forest conservation. 
Despite low profits but with relatively low conversion costs and stable 
returns over time, pasture generates the highest returns in 19 
municipalities. Municipalities are ranked according to their relative policy 
costs, a ranking which is compared to the distribution of forest carbon 
stocks across Acre. Finally, the relative cost per ton of carbon is derived, 
which enables the identification of a group of 13 municipalities with the 
greatest potential for ‘carbon bang’ for a given ‘buck’. 
 
Keywords: Acre; Cost-effectiveness; Forest Conservation; Option Value; Payments for Environmental 
Services; Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+); Uncertainty 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), policies could 
either attempt to reduce the profitability of agriculture, e.g. by removing agricultural subsidies, or 
offer positive incentives such as payment for environmental services (PES) that aim to put a price on 
forest externalities (Angelsen, 2010; Palmer, 2011). Although largely not 'results-based', the latter 
have come to dominate both project and nascent jurisdictional-scale REDD+ strategies (see e.g. 
Mahanty et al., 2013; Sills et al., 2014). Acre State in Brazil, the setting for our paper, is currently at 
the forefront of efforts to institutionalize jurisdictional-scale REDD+. At an estimated cost of US$260 
million, the State government’s objective is to reduce deforestation by 80% by 2020, thus conserving 
5.5 million hectares of forest in order to prevent the release of 62.5 million tons of CO2 emissions 
(Herbert, 2010). To this end, Acre has established a ‘PES-like’ scheme known as the Incentive System 
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for Environmental Services (SISA) framework, which aims at conserving forest carbon as well as 
biodiversity and hydrological services.  
When evaluating the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of PES, it is often assumed that future returns 
from forest conversion are known with certainty (e.g. Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Börner et al., 
2010; Groom and Palmer, 2010; Palmer and Silber, 2012; Curran et al., 2016). Yet, up-front 
investments combined with greater uncertainty in agricultural returns create incentives to delay the 
decision to convert forest to an alternative use (Schatzki, 2003). This implies that the level of 
incentives required to prevent forest conversion may need to be higher when faced by alternative 
land uses that have relatively low up-front conversion costs and stable returns over time. In general, 
a failure to consider uncertainty in future agricultural returns results in biased estimates of the 
opportunity costs of forest conservation, the interpretation of which can lead to potentially 
misleading policy implications. Indeed, the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) endorsed REDD+ as a cost-
effective climate change mitigation strategy based on such estimates. It is also commonly assumed 
that the environmental benefits from conserving forest are homogenous across space. Yet, it has 
become increasingly clear that this assumption is erroneous. For example, Saatchi et al. (2011) 
demonstrate wide variation in forest carbon stocks, even at the local scale, e.g. within municipalities. 
A failure to consider heterogeneity in forests and their corresponding eco-system services can thus 
lead to under- or over-estimates of benefits from conservation (see Vincent, 2016).   
In this paper, we model a hypothetical SISA payment in order to address two related questions. First, 
given the extent of uncertainty in land-use returns from forest conversion, what is the minimum 
level of payment Acre’s government should pay to landowners in order to ensure forest 
conservation with a 90% probability? Reflecting the common practice of Latin American incentive 
payment schemes, our payment is held constant over time. The ‘90% probability’ is an 
acknowledgement that should alternative land uses become highly profitable, e.g. due to rising 
commodity prices, it may not be possible to prevent contract breach thus reflecting imperfect 
enforcement of conservation contracts (e.g. Engel and Palmer, 2008; Jayachandran, 2013). For each 
of Acre’s municipalities, we estimate the uncertain returns for three alternative land uses: cattle, 
corn, and coffee. From these, we identify the minimum per hectare cost to the policymaker of 
conserving forest in each of Acre’s 22 municipalities before ranking the municipalities according to 
ascending payment levels, i.e. moving from the municipalities with the lowest opportunity costs to 
those with the highest ones. The second question we ask is whether and (if so) how this ranking of 
municipalities changes when we consider their carbon stocks. Finally, our estimates of policy costs 
are combined with carbon stock data to give a measure of environmental cost-effectiveness at the 
municipality scale. 
Against a backdrop of falling deforestation rates in Acre, around 50,000 hectares of forest were lost 
annually between 2001 and 2010, mainly to accommodate the expansion of cattle pasture. Thus, 
any policies that aim to reduce deforestation further, including SISA, would need to target farmers 
and private landowners. Funds for SISA remain dependent on public sources of funding despite a 
Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2010 with the US State of California to provide REDD+ 
credits. In general, there is currently little scope for the use of carbon markets and offsetting to 
augment Acre’s conservation budget. Given limited funds, a rational policymaker may seek to 
minimise the level of incentive while ensuring that it achieves the aim of slowing deforestation, i.e. 
by equalling or exceeding the opportunity costs of conserving forests. But even if the policymaker 
could somehow access private information on opportunity costs, there is then the problem of 
ensuring compliance over the duration of the conservation contract given changing and uncertain 
returns from forest conversion. In other words, opportunity costs are essentially a moving target for 
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policymakers. Not only do prices of agricultural commodities change over time but also those of 
various inputs, like fertilizers and labour.  
Given a limited conservation budget, the basic idea behind our analysis is to identify any parts of 
Acre where it might be possible to conserve a lot of carbon but at relatively low cost. With this 
paper, we aim to contribute to Acre’s ongoing efforts to design an efficient and effective set of 
forest conservation institutions, particularly with respect to jurisdictional REDD+, which are 
described in Section 2. We do so by adapting the model of uncertain land-use returns by Engel et al. 
(2015), in Section 3. First, we adapt their model so that it is more consistent with most Latin 
American PES schemes, namely by changing the incentive from a variable to a fixed, area-based 
payment and by creating a shorter payments period (five years instead of 30). Second, in examining 
three different land uses and with 22 different starting points, i.e. one for each municipality in Acre, 
we move away from their focus on a single alternative land use and a single starting point for 
estimating policy costs.  
We exploit spatial heterogeneity in land-use returns and model these returns over time using 
publicly available data, which are described in Section 4. Since similar data are increasingly collected 
and thus available for other tropical countries, in addition to other Brazilian states, our model can 
easily be applied to other settings and land uses. Further, we exploit the spatial variation in forest 
carbon stocks across the state and by comparing these with the relative land use returns, provide an 
economic rationale for the targeting of REDD+ payments. Building upon Engel et al. (2015), our 
analysis therefore not only estimates the spatial variation in the cost of keeping forests standing but 
also integrates these costs with forest carbon stock data in order to derive a measure of cost-
effectiveness across municipalities. In sum, our model offers a novel and straightforward way of 
allocating scarce conservation resources and while our focus is on forest climate benefits, it can 
easily be expanded to accommodate other ecosystem services and biodiversity. 
Presented in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6, our results suggest that although pasture and 
cattle ranching is not particularly profitable, it is the land use which results in the highest (relative) 
returns to landowners under uncertainty, in 19 out of 22 municipalities. With relatively low 
conversion costs and little volatility in its returns processes, pasture determines the minimum 
payment level in these areas. Upon ranking municipalities by payment level and by carbon stock, we 
find that cheaper municipalities tend not to have higher stocks. However, this type of ranking tends 
to mask the wide differences found among municipalities. Our empirical exercise demonstrates that 
there is a substantial economically-meaningful and policy-relevant variation among municipalities. 
On the basis of cost per tonne of carbon, we identify 13 municipalities in which it might be possible 
to obtain a substantially larger 'carbon bang' for one's 'buck' in contrast to the other nine 
municipalities.  
 
2. BACKGROUND TO ACRE STATE, BRAZIL 
Acre in western Brazil has become a world leader in reducing deforestation while growing its 
economy (Schwartzman, 2015). The State is home to around 750,000 people with almost half of 
these living in the capital, Rio Branco, with the remainder spread among its 22 municipalities (Figure 
1).  Since the election of The Acre Workers Party and their allies The Popular Front in 1998 the State 
government has followed the vision of legendary rubber tapper and environmental activist Chico 
Mendes towards a sustainable development pathway for the State. 
Figure 1: Municipalities of Acre State, Brazil  
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About 14.3 million hectares (143,000km2) of intact, richly diverse forest, approximately 87% of its 
total area, is found within State borders. Primary forest makes up over 85% of forest cover. The 
majority of this forest is covered by some form of protection, whether indigenous territory, parks or 
reserves. Deforestation has fallen over recent years, from an average annual deforestation rate of 
60,200 hectares (602 km2) per year between 1996 and 2005, to 49,600 hectares (496 km2) per year 
between 2001 and 2010. The State set itself two main deforestation goals, to reduce levels by 60% 
of the 1990-2005 average by 2012, and by 80% by 2020. Total emissions for the State were 
estimated at 22,683,000 tCO2e in 2010, of which 97% came from deforestation and land 
degradation. The reduction in deforestation rates has meant that Acre has managed to move 
forward in issuing verified emission reduction credits to the tune of 11.5mt CO2e through the Markit 
registry (Forest Trends, 2015). In order to meet the State’s deforestation goals and achieve verifiable 
emission reductions it has created the Incentive System for Environmental Services (SISA) 
framework, along with operational principles for a system of incentives, not only for forest carbon 
but also biodiversity and hydrological services.  
The majority of deforested lands are now pasture (TerraClass, 2011) and this is representative of the 
typology of the agricultural sector in Acre. Pasture lands make up approximately 8% of total land 
area of the State. By contrast, temporary crops take up 1% of total land area, of which cassava and 
corn account for the greatest share. The acreage of permanent crops is much smaller, just 0.1% of 
land area. The largest permanent crop is banana, approximately 60% of the total, followed by rubber 
and coffee, at around 11% each.  
Acre has 22 municipalities. A major land zoning exercise in 2006 focusing on both economic and 
ecological concerns created four major land-use zones (Governo do Estado do Acre, 2011): Zone 1 
(25% of State land) is private land or agricultural settlements of which approximately half is 
deforested; Zone 2 (49%) is intact primary or managed forests in indigenous territories, sustainable 
use reserves, settlement projects, state and national production forests, and strictly protected areas; 
Zone 3 (26%) has largely intact forest cover but has land tenure that is unclear or where claims 
overlap; and, Zone 4 (0.2%) is defined as urban. 
 
3. MODEL 
Engel et al. (2015) developed a general model of a conservation payment scheme with fixed and 
variable components in which the latter is either indexed to the value of one or more services 
provided by forest, e.g. carbon, or to the expected returns from forest conversion, e.g. soya bean 
production. By tracking carbon or soya prices, this variable component thus allows the payment to 
vary over time. The scheme’s objective is to provide sufficient incentives to keep land in forest 
rather than convert it to an alternative use. In this paper, we retain their objective and basic model 
but adapt the latter in three ways. First, since shorter contracts are typically found in Latin American 
payment for environmental services (PES) schemes, e.g. in Costa Rica (Pagiola, 2008), we model a 
conservation contract of five rather than 30 years. Second, also in common with many Latin 
American payment schemes, we model a payment that is not indexed but instead is fixed and 
unchanging over time. Finally, although our payment is characterised as an incentive provided by 
Acre's government to conserve forest carbon stocks (a generic ‘REDD+ payment’), it does not reflect 
the social value of the carbon in a given hectare of forest. Rather, it is calculated as the minimum 
payment required to keep forest standing when the returns from alternative land uses are uncertain. 
Below, we intuitively explain the theory underlying our adaptation of the model, a formal 
presentation of which can be found in Engel et al. (2015). 
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Landowner’s decision 
For a single hectare of land, profits can be generated from one of two alternative uses: forest (F) or 
agriculture (A). For simplicity, we do not specify A in this section, although as explained in Section 4 
it can be pasture (cattle), corn, or coffee. Whenever land use is changed from F to A, conversion 
costs, CCFA, are sunk immediately. Proﬁts to the landowner from forest conservation are generated 
by a REDD+ payment scheme implemented by Acre’s State government. This payment is paid 
annually and is fixed at F, i.e. future returns from forest are certain. Net proﬁts from agriculture are 
generated from crop sales5 and future returns from agriculture are uncertain. 
In theory, the presence of uncertainty in agricultural returns should delay land conversion until the 
value of non-use beneﬁts equals the value of land in the next-best alternative use plus conversion 
costs plus an option value. Our aim is to identify an F that makes this option value suﬃciently large 
to deter land conversion for a total of five years. New information about the uncertain returns from 
agriculture is assumed to become available at various times such that they may be modelled as a 
stochastic process (e.g. geometric Brownian motion, GBM). The net returns from agriculture to the 
land owner, A, is private information and (partially) evolves as a function of the constant trend 
parameter µA the (positive) constant uncertainty parameter σA. A positive (negative) µA indicates 
that net agricultural proﬁts are, on average, increasing (decreasing). 
On each day, dt, a landowner receives Fdt if the land is in forest or Adt if the land is in agriculture. 
With a starting point of land in forest, the landowner decides, every six months, whether to continue 
conserving forest or to convert the forest to agriculture. The decision to change land use generates 
instantaneous proﬁts net of conversion costs. Alternatively, the landowner can delay the decision to 
deforest and continue to receive REDD+ payments. In the latter case, the landowner receives a 
payment of Fdt and the discounted future expected returns from forest conservation. Therefore, πF 
represents the sum of the landowner’s returns from non-use beneﬁts of the forest (current land use) 
and the future value of land in the next-best alternative use (forest or agriculture). All returns are 
valued by discounting their expected values at the constant, continuously compounded, risk-free 
discount rate r.  
REDD+ payment parameters 
Our model is used to simulate REDD+ payment scenarios in order to estimate the level of incentive 
needed to ensure that the landowner continues to postpone the decision to switch from forest to 
agriculture. The landowner’s opportunity costs of forest conservation are the forgone returns to 
agriculture, A. Given A we estimate the level of the REDD+ payment that ensures forest 
conservation. We assume that Acre’s government seeks to achieve conservation at the lowest 
possible cost and that the landowner will not always comply with the REDD+ contract. Thus, we 
introduce the possibility that at some point it might be more profitable for the landowner to convert 
forest to agriculture. The potential for contract breach is modelled using a probability-based 
criterion, in which p is defined as the probability of avoiding deforestation and (1 − p) corresponds to 
the probability of deforestation. For a given hectare of forest, we establish a probability level of 
p=0.9 and a time horizon of T = 5 and estimate the REDD+ payment necessary to ensure that the 
land remains in forest.6  
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 Conversion from forest to agriculture may also generate a one-time timber proﬁt. Such extra proﬁt may be 
explicitly accounted for by modeling the timber price, the volume of timber extracted from the forest, and the 
harvest costs. For model tractability, we do not explicitly model these proﬁts. In Section 5, however, we 
incorporate a one-oﬀ timber proﬁt. 
6
 We argue that a 90% probability of avoiding deforestation reflects Acre’s ongoing efforts to build institutional 
capacity for REDD+ at the jurisdictional level, including institutions for monitoring and enforcement. 
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Note that, operationally, we implement the same payment regime as Engel et al. (2015), = 𝑐 + 𝛼. 𝐼 , 
where c is a constant per-hectare payment and I is a per-hectare indexed component scaled by a 
pre-set coefficient α. In our adaptation, the landowners’ opportunity costs of forest conservation are 
based on uncertain coffee/corn/beef returns and the REDD+ payment has (virtually) zero volatility. 
However, for technical reasons, we cannot set this to zero. Instead, with the (very small) REDD+ 
payment variability we calibrate the policy via α and set c to zero. The REDD+ payment is virtually 
constant (α  = 0.005). 
To determine the REDD+ payment that satisﬁes this criterion, we ﬁrst evaluate the optimal 
conversion boundaries given a speciﬁc set of model parameters. Specifically, these boundaries 
depend upon the values of the: parameters of the returns from forest Ft and agriculture At, 
respectively; conversion costs CCFA; and, discount rate r.  We then solve for the optimal land-use 
change numerically. Instead of modelling the price and crop yield uncertainties separately, the 
agricultural returns processes are modelled directly. This simpliﬁes our analysis considerably and 
allows us to utilize existing numerical techniques, used by e.g. Miranda and Fackler (2002), Dangl 
and Wirl (2004), to solve the optimal land–conversion problem. In Section 5, we parameterize the 
returns processes.   
For a given REDD+ payment level, we simulate the returns from agriculture. When these returns are 
below the conversion boundary CFA, the landowner prefers to switch land use, converting forest to 
agriculture. This comparison is assessed every six months. The simulation yields a converted path 
when agriculture becomes more proﬁtable than forest at any given comparison node. With forest 
conversion, the contract is breached and REDD+ payments cease, which is equivalent to imposing a 
conditionality clause on the REDD+ contract. Dividing the total number of non-converted paths by 
the number of simulations, S, we compute the likelihood of a land-use change from forest to 
agriculture not occurring, ?̂?. The probability-based criterion is met when ?̂? ≥ 𝑝 = 0.9. 
 
4. DATA  
Applying the model presented in Section 3 to real-world data requires first identifying the 
commonest land use transitions from forest conversion in Acre State over a five-year period. From 
Section 3, pasture for cattle ranching was clearly more common than any of the other land uses put 
together. We also select corn as one of the most popular temporary crops and coffee, a permanent 
crop, which has been gaining in popularity in the region. Municipality-level production data are 
shown in Appendix 1. Simplified transitions for these three land uses are shown in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Land use transition for pasture, corn and coffee, in Acre State  
Note that for the five-year duration of contract it was often the case that land once planted, and 
with conversion costs sunk, would remain either in pasture or coffee for the whole of this time. For 
corn, however, farmers often switched to a different land use after three years thus incurring 
another round of conversion costs. We are unable to build another land-use decision into our model 
simulations for corn and for tractability instead assumed that corn was planted for five years. 
Switching from corn to beef or coffee within five years would not, however, significantly change the 
ranking of municipalities by minimum payment level.  
Daily profits 
The returns from converting a hectare of land from forest to agriculture depend upon a variety of 
factors including production costs, clearance and conversion costs, yields, prices and transportation 
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costs. We combine these factors to give daily profits that help us to generate Adt. The per-hectare 
return (in US$) on day t from agricultural commodity x is given by: 
𝜋𝑡𝑥 = (𝑃𝑡𝑥𝑌𝑥) − (𝐹𝑖𝑥 + 𝐿𝑡𝑥 + 𝐹𝑒𝑡𝑥 + 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑥 + 𝑇𝑡𝑥) [1] 
where 𝑃 is the price of commodity x in US$/tonne, 𝑌 is its yield (tonne/ha), 𝐿 is its labour cost 
(US$/ha), 𝐹𝑒 is its fertiliser cost (US$/ha), 𝐹𝑢 is its fuel cost (US$/ha), 𝐹𝑖𝑥 is its fixed cost (US$/ha), 
and 𝑇 is the cost of transporting x to market (US$/ha). 
For each of corn, cattle and coffee, we estimate the value of each of these variables for each day in 
the five-year period between March 31, 2006 and December 30, 2010, before calculating daily 
returns. Daily agricultural price data are combined with quarterly data on labour costs, annual yield 
data, and overall costs per hectare for fixed, labour, fertiliser and fuel in order to create daily 
revenue and cost time-series, with the costs subtracted from the revenue series to give net profits. 
We draw the majority of data from the Brazilian Agricultural Census of 2006 (IBGE, 2006). 
Prices (P) 
Prices for corn, coffee and cattle are obtained from CEPEA.7 These data are for daily prices recorded 
on exchanges in São Paulo. Given the remoteness of Acre state to this market the prices that farmers 
receive for their product is likely to differ from those offered in São Paulo. Factors such as 
transportation costs and the extent of local demand are likely to cause a variation in prices. We 
convert the daily price series into an estimation of Acre-level prices. The difference between the 
prices in Rio Branco (obtained from quantity and value data provided by IBGE, 2006) and São Paulo 
on January 1, 2006 is calculated. This gives a relative difference in prices on that date, which are 
then applied to the time series as a whole. Three different price series resulted: a São Paulo price for 
which transportation to São Paulo must be added; a Rio Branco price that is a relative amendment of 
the São Paulo price; and, a Rio Branco price that is an absolute level amendment of the São Paulo 
price. For the latter two, transportation costs to Rio Branco are added. Based on the nature of the 
commodities and markets the price series for corn and cattle are taken from Rio Branco with the 
relative amendment, given the likelihood that much of this production is consumed within the State. 
For coffee, we use the São Paulo price given that much of this product is transported out of the State 
for export. 
Yields (Y) 
Municipality level annual yields for coffee and corn are drawn directly from the Brazilian Agricultural 
Census.8 Cattle yield is estimated using data on head of cattle and area of pasture from the Census.9 
An average weight of 450kg per head of cattle and an annual offtake of 8.5% are assumed based on 
Bowman et al. (2012).   
Labour, fertiliser and fuel costs (L, Fe, Fu) 
We draw upon municipality-level cost data for labour, fertiliser and fuel for corn, cattle and coffee 
from the 2006 Brazilian Agricultural Census.10 This gives total municipality-level production 
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 Yields are calculated using quantity and acreage from Table 949 of the 2006 census. The entry ‘Milho em 
grão’ is used for corn. 
9
 Head of cattle from Table 73 of the 2006 census and area of pasture from Table 1031. 
10
 Table 5445 of the 2006 census. Data for ‘Cultibatio de cereais’ and coffee was used.. 
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expenditure for a variety of different inputs for the year 2006. Costs per hectare are calculated using 
municipality acreage, also drawn from the Brazilian Agricultural Census.11  
For corn and coffee some missing cost data are estimated by the authors. For corn, missing data for 
fertiliser costs are estimated using coefficients from a regression of fertiliser costs on salary costs, 
for all municipalities in the Legal Amazon. For coffee, data are estimated for total, fertiliser, salary 
and fuel costs. Fuel costs are estimated using the coefficients from a regression of fuel costs on yield 
and yield-squared, again for all municipalities in the Legal Amazon. In turn, fertiliser, salary and total 
costs are estimated using coefficients from a regression of these costs upon fuel costs, once more 
for all municipalities in the Legal Amazon. Details of variables used and the regression results can be 
found in Appendix 2 and 3.    
We use these cost data to create a March 31, 2006 benchmark for labour, fuel and fertiliser before 
scaling each one of these factors with a relevant price index in order to obtain daily prices. Gasoline 
and fertiliser prices are scaled using, respectively, monthly gasoline prices from Reuters for the 
Central-West region of Brazil, and a weekly time series for the price of Monoammonium Phosphate 
in Brazil from the CRU group, i.e. used as a proxy for all fertilisers. Labour costs are converted into 
daily costs across the time series using the industrial labour wages index for North and Central-West 
Brazil (IBGE, 2006). 
Fixed costs (Fix) 
Agricultural production requires a variety of other costs beyond labour, fuel and fertiliser costs. The 
Brazilian Agricultural Census reports costs in a number of other categories including lease costs of 
the land, seeds, packaging, pesticides, taxes and machine rental. As the prices of these items are 
unlikely to vary on a daily basis we aggregate them together into a fixed costs item at the level 
reported in the 2006 Census. This level is assumed fixed for the entire five-year time period. 
Transportation Costs (T) 
Transportation costs are calculated using cost per unit per km obtained from SIFRECA’s Anuario 2010 
(SIFRECA, 2010). Mid-term costs per km for 2010 were used for each of the three commodities and 
converted into US$ using an exchange rate of 1:2.135 (obtained from Oanda12). For each of the 
municipalities, the shortest distance by road to Rio Branco and Sao Paulo is estimated from Google 
maps. For those municipalities with no road access, fixed distances of 4500km to Sao Paulo and 
1000km to Rio Branco are used. Cost per unit per km is converted into cost per hectare using our 
yield data. 
Daily, total net profits are calculated by multiplying daily prices by yield per hectare to generate total 
revenue per hectare. These production costs are then subtracted from net revenue to give net 
profits per hectare per day. 
Other data 
Clearance and conversion costs 
Crucial to the decision to convert forest to agriculture is the cost of clearing forest and converting 
the remaining land so that it is suitable for agriculture. Clearance and conversion costs are 
composed of three components that differ depending on the type of conversion. For conversion 
from standing forest there is a cost of clearing the trees and potential revenue from selling some of 
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 Table 949 of the 2006 census for Corn and Coffee, and Table 1031 for Cattle. 
12
 See: http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/  
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the cleared timber. For establishment of each of the different commodities there are various 
infrastructural costs.  
The costs of clearing forest are drawn from estimates of forest management in Acre by d’Oliveira et 
al. (2005), which are given as US$48.4 per m3 of harvested timber. Revenues from selling cleared 
timber are calculated given an estimated volume of commercial timber per ha for Acre of 20 m3/ha 
(ibid). Timber prices are drawn from roundwood timber prices calculated from quantity produced 
and value reported by IBGE. These are converted to US$ using the January 2006 exchange rate from 
Oanda. 
Infrastructure costs are sourced from de Almedia and Uhl (1995). Estimates for slash and burn 
annual crops are used for corn infrastructure, intensive agriculture/perennial crops are used for 
coffee and unimproved pastures are used for cattle. The 1995 estimates are converted to 2006 
estimates by first converting the figures into Brazilian Real using the 1995 exchange rate from 
Oanda, applying the World Bank GDP deflator, and then converting back to US$ using the 2006 
exchange rate.  
Carbon density 
Carbon density data are extracted from the underlying 1km x 1km carbon map in Saatchi et al. 
(2011). Mean carbon density per hectare (MgC per ha) is estimated for each municipality. These are 
mapped onto Figure 3, with the municipalities ranked in Figure 4 as box plots that show the 
distribution of carbon density within each municipality. From Figure 3, it can be seen that the lowest 
mean carbon densities are to be found in municipalities near the State capital, Rio Branco. These 
municipalities also display greater variation around the mean values in the form of larger boxes, 
which suggests the presence of a greater diversity of forest in different stages of transition, from 
pristine, primary forest to heavily degraded forest, in contrast to some of the more remote 
municipalities. 
Figure 3: Map of mean carbon density (MgC/ha) for each municipality in Acre State 
Figure 4: Ranking of mean carbon density (in MgC/ha, lowest to highest) by municipality in Acre 
State 
 
5. RESULTS 
We first present our estimates of daily net profits for our three agricultural land uses (pasture 
(cattle), corn, and coffee) at the municipality scale over a five-year period. These estimates are used 
to calculate our model parameters, which are then combined with our estimates of up-front 
clearance costs in order to simulate the returns processes under uncertainty for each land use in 
each and every municipality in Acre State. The returns are then ranked to give the policymaker's cost 
of the minimum payment to landowners in each municipality. Cost per municipality is then 
compared with the distribution of carbon densities across the State. From our estimates of minimum 
payment and data for mean carbon stock, we derive a novel measure of relative environmental cost-
effectiveness. 
Daily net profits 
Table 1 presents a summary of patterns in the daily per hectare net profits from pasture, corn and 
coffee between 2006 and 2010. Only one of these land uses remains profitable over the whole 
10 
 
period in 11 municipalities, typically corn. We obtain negative net profits due to basing our 
calculations on observable market prices, which proxy for landowners’ returns from alternative land 
uses. Pasture appears to result in consistent negative net profits in most municipalities. Figure 5 
illustrates these patterns for selected municipalities. Bujari is a good example of one where there is a 
clearly ‘strictly dominant’ profitable land use, in this case coffee. There, a rational land owner would 
convert forest to this land use rather than either of the other two. Feijó, on the other hand, 
illustrates a case where ‘the lines cross’ and the relative profitability of one land use changes such 
that at different times it would be rational to switch from one of corn, coffee or pasture, to one of 
the other two, and back again at a later date.  
Table 1: Summary of patterns of per hectare daily net profits for pasture (cattle), corn, and coffee 
for Acre’s municipalities, 2006-2010 
Figure 5: Daily net profits in US$ for Bujari and Feijó, 2006-2010 
In general, and of relevance for modelling returns processes under uncertainty, coffee appears to 
have the most volatile net profits while beef has the least. Recall that greater volatility in returns is 
predicted to lead to a greater incentive to delay land-use change, from forest to agriculture. A 
measure of volatility is more important than the absolute level of profits in determining the relative 
level of returns under uncertainty, and the likelihood of whether the landowner is likely to stay with 
forest or convert to an alternative land use. This implies that negative net profits can be used to 
estimate volatility and model returns processes under uncertainty. 
Clearance costs 
From net profits, which allow us to estimate the volatility in returns over time, we now turn our 
attention to the second key component needed to estimate land-use returns under uncertainty: up-
front clearance costs. For each municipality, clearance costs are given in Table 2. 
Table 2: Clearance costs by municipality for forest-corn, forest-coffee & forest-pasture (US$/ha) 
By a factor of three to four, and often more, Table 2 shows that clearing forest for coffee is more 
expensive than corn or pasture in all municipalities. Clearance costs of the latter two are broadly 
equivalent, although corn is typically the cheapest. This implies that the decision to delay is likely to 
be greatest for landowners considering converting forest to coffee, followed by pasture and corn, 
and indicates that coffee has a lower degree of reversibility than the other two land uses. In sum, 
given the trends in volatility and clearance costs, the cultivation of coffee would appear to give the 
greatest incentives to delay the decision to convert forest in comparison to pasture or corn. We now 
turn to calibrating these trends more precisely in order to estimate landowners’ returns under 
uncertainty.   
Returns under uncertainty 
The model presented in Section 3, namely the constant trend parameter, µ, and the variance, σ, is 
calibrated using the estimated daily profits. The calibrated parameters are presented in Table 3 for 
each land use and for all of Acre’s municipalities. The three columns represent the three alternative 
land uses from forest conversion, i.e. forest-corn, forest-coffee and forest-pasture. Recall that a 
positive (negative) µ indicates that net agricultural proﬁts are, on average, increasing (decreasing); 
by comparing net profits in Table 1 with the trend parameters in Table 3 this pattern can be clearly 
discerned.  
Table 3: Calibrated parameters for the three alternative land uses by municipality 
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For each municipality, we compare the opportunity costs of forest conservation (for three different 
alternative land uses: coffee, corn, beef) under uncertainty with a certain REDD+ payment in order 
to ensure the land stays in forest with a probability p of 90 percent over a time period T of five years. 
Thus, the level of REDD+ payment is ‘set’ to make forest the preferable ‘alternative’ 90% of the 
times/simulations. From this, we can estimate the minimum level of payment Acre's government 
should make in order to ensure forest conservation with a 90% probability given uncertain land-use 
returns from forest conversion.  
After estimating the uncertain returns for pasture, corn, and coffee in each municipality, we then 
assume that a rational landowner would choose the one that would earn her the highest returns. 
This establishes the minimum level at which the REDD+ payment should be set by the policymaker, 
and is characterised as a cost to the policymaker. It is the number which is highlighted in one of the 
three ‘Cost’ columns of Table 4 for each municipality. Note that ‘Cost’ is given as a relative rather 
than an absolute number due to the predominance of negative net profits reported in Table 1. 
Figure 6 displays the data for all three ‘Cost’ columns’ for each municipality and Figure 7 displays the 
data for the highlighted column (minimum payment) for each municipality in geographic form.  
Table 4: Ranked relative land-use returns under uncertainty (‘Cost’ per ha; lowest first) and mean 
carbon stock by municipality (ranking in parentheses, highest first) 
Figure 6: Relative cost of payment per ha to cover opportunity cost of each land use by 
municipality 
Figure 7: Map of the minimum payment required to maintain the forest for each municipality. 
Relative ‘Cost’ allows for a comparison of minimum REDD+ payments both across land uses within 
municipalities and across municipalities. Municipalities are ranked according to ‘Cost’, lowest first, 
highest last. Thus, Brasiléia has the lowest relative cost of all the municipalities if we assume that 
landowners in every municipality were to convert forest and choose the agricultural land use with 
the highest opportunity cost in that municipality in the absence of a payment.  
Table 4 shows where a policymaker in Acre might target conservation funds if minimising costs per 
hectare - thus spreading the budget among as many hectares of forest as possible – is assumed to be 
the sole aim of policy. The final column of Table 4 presents the data underlying the carbon density 
map (Figure 3) along with the ranks used to create Figure 4. From this, the most carbon dense 
municipality, on average, Assis Brasil, is ranked 17 according to policy cost, i.e. one of the more 
expensive municipalities for paying landowners to keep land in forest. While there are no clear 
patterns with regards to cost ranking and carbon ranking, Jordão stands out as a place where a 
payments scheme may be cheap (ranking #3) and carbon benefits are likely to be high (ranking#2). 
Perhaps a more efficient way of targeting payments, at least given the distribution of carbon stocks, 
is to move away from a ranking based on costs alone. Given wide variation in mean carbon stocks 
among the municipalities, cheaper areas may not contain as much carbon as some of the more 
expensive areas. Figure 8 presents the relative cost per ton of carbon, indexed to the municipality 
with the lowest cost: Santa Rosa do Purus. On this basis, we can see that Assis Brasil, our most 
carbon-dense municipality, is ranked second and only just a bit more costly than Santa Rosa do 
Purus. By contrast, Jordão is over 50 percent more expensive than either of these two municipalities. 
The most expensive municipalities by far are Rodrigues Alves and Placido de Castro, which are, 
respectively, over three and 2.5 times more expensive than Santa Rosa do Purus.  
Figure 8: Relative cost per ton carbon  
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6. DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we estimated the returns under uncertainty from three different, alternative land uses 
for each and every municipality in Acre State, Brazil. Since these land uses have been shown to drive 
the decision of whether or not to deforest, addressing them should be central to the formulation of 
REDD+ policy in the State, in particular, ongoing efforts to design a programme of incentive 
payments such as SISA. Building upon the model of conservation payments by Engel et al. (2015), we 
modelled our REDD+ payment on the basis of a fixed financial incentive, which allowed us to 
estimate the minimum level of payment that might be sufficient to incentivise a five-year delay in 
the decision to convert forest to pasture, corn or coffee. Following, we then combined the relative 
cost of the payment with mean amounts of carbon found in each municipality in order to assess how 
much 'carbon bang' a policy maker might obtain for a given 'buck'. 
Given that up-front investments combined with greater uncertainty in agricultural returns creates 
incentives to delay the decision to convert forest to an alternative land use, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that cattle-ranching determines the level of the minimum payment for most 
municipalities. Despite not being a highly profitable land use, pasture has relatively low up-front 
costs and generates stable returns over time, certainly in contrast to coffee. The incentive to delay 
conversion to pasture is often lower than that for coffee thus necessitating a higher payment to the 
landowner. In other words, the returns from coffee are subject to greater volatility than pasture (or 
corn), which lowers the opportunity cost of forest conservation and consequently, generates a larger 
option value to delay forest conversion. This indicates that coffee has a lower degree of reversibility 
than the other two land uses.  
Looking across Acre, the most expensive municipalities in which to conserve forest are those in the 
middle of the State, following the main highway, BR364. The cheaper municipalities are mostly 
located in more remote areas in the North West and the South East. However, municipalities 
identified as having minimum payments at the lower end of the scale tend not to be the ones with 
the highest carbon stocks. Our ranking of carbon stocks obscures the wide variation among (and 
within) municipalities. We tried to account for this variation by estimating the cost per ton of carbon 
and hence, can identify a group of 13 municipalities in which costs vary by up to 25%. From Figure 8, 
this group comprises Porto Walter to Santa Rosa do Purus. Our estimates imply that it is these 
municipalities that might be prioritised for cost-effective conservation of forest carbon stocks. 
Our estimates of minimum payment levels are quite similar across municipalities yet are dependent 
on the quality and quantity of publicly-available data. There is a predominance of negative net 
profits, which are an obstacle to obtaining absolute rather than relative cost estimates. We 
conjecture that commercial production may simply be unprofitable in much of Acre given 
remoteness and high costs. For instance, we may be underestimating prices. The São Paulo price, 
even with adjustment may not reflect higher prices in local markets due to their remoteness. 
Subsistence agriculture dominates in a lot of municipalities, which is unlikely to be accounted for in 
government-collected statistics. Given that the survey from which IBGE draws data only captures a 
few large-scale farmers, when most farms tend to utilise more own labour on farm, we may be 
overestimating costs. Finally, we may be underestimating yields and note that our estimates may be 
missing subsidies that effectively reduce costs or increase profits, e.g. credit subsidies. 
In generating our results, we assume a certain REDD+ payment over time. There remains, however, 
great uncertainty about the future of REDD+ both in terms of the policy architecture and its funding 
13 
 
(Laing et al., 2016). This helps explain why we opted to model five-year contracts in Acre, a State 
that has already gone some way to positioning itself not only as ‘conservation friendly’ but also as a 
jurisdiction for implementing REDD+ policies. That said, our approach is applicable in other settings, 
where there may be less certainty with respect to REDD+ funding and policy. Indeed, our results hold 
if the REDD+ payment is uncertain but relatively less uncertain than the returns from agriculture. 
Given limited conservation budgets, our model offers a novel and straightforward way of utilising 
publicly-available data to target such funds. It can also be easily expanded to incorporate other 
ecosystem services and biodiversity. Indeed, the mapping of policy costs and forest benefits would 
help to address the potential for so-called ‘win-win’ strategies with respect to REDD+ and 
biodiversity conservation (e.g. see Phelps et al., 2012). Thus, once we factor in the distribution of 
biodiversity over space our results could potentially favour some of the cheaper municipalities 
where carbon may not be so abundant. This could assist in the targeting and design of a policy such 
as SISA, which aims to cover multiple environmental benefits of forests, and not just forest carbon 
alone. 
While our analysis is motivated by the fact of limited forest conservation budgets in Acre, we have 
little information on the precise nature of these budgets. Money is received from a variety of public 
sources and there may be potential for future funding from more diverse sources, perhaps 
depending on the future trajectory of federal REDD+ policy. So, while there is a possibility for a 
domestic federal REDD+ programme leading to inter-state financial transfers in the future, it remains 
to be seen whether there will be much scope for finance from international sources like California’s 
cap and trade system and multinational firms. Thus, the extent of future finance for Acre's REDD+ 
strategy remains unknown. Either way, our modelling exercise remains relevant, more so if we are 
able to improve upon our net profit estimates and scale up our per hectare estimates of policy costs 
in order to quantify aggregate costs both within municipalities and across Acre as a whole. Finally, 
we could build into our analysis the possibility of trading per reforms to Brazil's Forest Code. This 
would allow us to model the potential impacts of trading vis-à-vis REDD+ policy goals. 
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FIGURES & TABLES 
Figure 1: Municipalities of Acre State, Brazil 
 
Source: Authors adapted from Wikipedia (2015)    
1 Acrelândia 12 Marechal Thaumaturgo 
2 Assis Brasil 13 Plácido de Castro 
3 Brasiléia  14 Porto Acre 
4 Bujari  15 Porto Walter 
5 Capixaba  16 Rio Branco 
6 Cruzeiro do Sul 17 Rodrigues Alves 
7 Epitaciolândia 18 Santa Rosa do Purus 
8 Feijó  19 Sena Madureira 
9 Jordão 22 Xapuri 20 Senador Guiomard 
10 Mâncio Lima 21 Tarauacá 
11 Manoel Urbano  22 Xapuri 
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Figure 2: Land use transition for pasture, corn and coffee, in Acre State  
 
  
Source: Authors 
  
Clear
Pasture Corn Coffee
Pasture for 
five years
Coffee for 
five years
Corn for 
three years
Fallow Pasture Coffee
Conversion costs
Conversion costs
18 
 
Figure 3: Map of mean carbon density (MgC/ha) for each municipality in Acre State 
 
Source: Authors; data from Saatchi et al. (2011) 
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Figure 4: Ranking of mean carbon density (in MgC/ha, lowest to highest) by municipality in Acre 
State 
 
Source: Authors; data from Saatchi et al. (2011) 
Note: the centre of each box is the mean value; the extent of each box denotes one standard 
deviation around the mean. 
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Figure 5: Daily net profits in US$ per ha for Bujari and Feijó, 2006-2010 
 
 
Source: Authors 
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Figure 6: Relative cost of payment per ha to cover opportunity cost of each land use by 
municipality 
 
Source: Authors 
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Figure 7: Map of the minimum payment required to maintain the forest for each municipality. 
 
Source: Authors  
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Figure 8: Relative cost per ton carbon  
 
Source: Authors 
Note: Cost per ton carbon is relative to value for the lowest cost municipality Santa Rosa do Purus 
(indexed at 1)  
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Table 1: Summary of patterns of per hectare daily net profits for pasture (cattle), corn, and coffee 
for Acre’s municipalities, 2006-2010  
Municipality Daily net profits are: Is there a strictly 
dominant 
profitable land 
use? 
Positive all the 
time 
Positive some of the 
time, negative 
otherwise  
Negative all the 
time 
Acrelandia  Coffee Pasture, corn No 
Assis Brasil  Corn  Pasture, coffee Yes – corn  
Brasiléia  Corn Pasture Coffee Yes – corn  
Bujari  Coffee Corn Pasture Yes – coffee 
Capixaba Corn  Pasture, coffee Yes – corn 
Cruzeiro do Sul   Corn  Pasture, coffee Yes – corn 
Epitaciolândia  Corn  Pasture, coffee No 
Feijó   Coffee, corn Pasture No 
Jordão  Corn Coffee Pasture Yes – corn 
Mâncio Lima  Coffee  Pasture, corn Yes – coffee  
Manoel Urbano   Pasture, coffee, 
corn 
No 
Marechal 
Thaumaturgo 
Coffee Corn Pasture Yes – coffee  
Plácido de Castro Corn  Pasture, coffee Yes – corn  
Porto Walter  Corn Pasture, coffee Yes – corn  
Rio Branco  Corn Pasture, coffee No 
Rodrigues Alves  Coffee Pasture, corn Yes – coffee  
Santa Rosa do 
Purus 
 Coffee Pasture, corn Yes – coffee  
Sena Madureira Corn Coffee Pasture Yes – corn  
Senador 
Guiomard 
 Corn Pasture, coffee No 
Tarauacá  Corn, coffee Pasture No 
Xapuri Corn Pasture Coffee Yes – corn  
Porto Acre Corn Pasture Coffee Yes – corn  
Source: Authors 
  
25 
 
Table 2: Clearance costs by municipality for forest-corn, forest-coffee & forest-pasture (US$/ha) 
Municipality  
Forest-
corn 
Forest-
coffee 
Forest-
Pasture 
Acrelandia 1097 3714 1115 
Assis Brasil 911 3528 928 
Brasiléia 938 3555 955 
Bujari 1135 3752 1152 
Capixaba 929 3546 946 
Cruzeiro do Sul 441 3058 459 
Epitaciolândia 929 3546 946 
Feijó 347 2964 365 
Jordão 314 2931 331 
Mâncio Lima 491 3108 508 
Manoel Urbano 929 3546 946 
Marechal Thaumaturgo 401 3018 418 
Plácido de Castro 1097 3714 1115 
Porto Walter 461 3078 479 
Rio Branco 929 3546 946 
Rodrigues Alves 399 3016 416 
Santa Rosa do Purus 948 3565 965 
Sena Madureira 929 3546 946 
Senador Guiomard 1023 3640 1040 
Tarauacá 348 2965 365 
Xapuri 948 3565 965 
Porto Acre 1060 3677 1077 
 Source: Authors’ own calculations from data described in text  
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Table 3: Calibrated parameters for the three land uses by municipality 
Municipality  Corn Coffee Beef 
 μ σ μ σ μ σ 
Acrelandia -0.0003 0.0276 0.0005 0.379 -0.0003 0.0118 
Assis Brasil 0.0011 0.0205 -0.0017 0.0431 0.0001 0.0115 
Brasiléia 0.0015 0.0248 -0.0003 0.0109 0.0024 0.414 
Bujari 0.0006 0.5255 0.0007 0.0218 -0.0004 0.0097 
Capixaba 0.0014 0.0233 -0.0014 0.0402 0 0.0043 
Cruzeiro do Sul -0.0003 0.402 -0.0016 0.0426 0 0.0031 
Epitaciolândia -0.0003 0.277 -0.0013 0.0381 -0.0008 0.0197 
Feijó -0.0016 0.4148 0.0017 0.637 -0.0002 0.0073 
Jordão 0.0015 0.0237 0 0 -0.0017 0.152 
Mâncio Lima -0.0018 0.1958 0.0007 0.0225 -0.0001 0.0099 
Manoel Urbano 0.0002 0.0204 -0.0023 0.0435 -0.0001 0.0107 
Marechal 
Thaumaturgo -0.0017 0.2401 0.0008 0.023 0.0001 0.0064 
Plácido de Castro 0.0025 0.0551 -0.0014 0.0404 -0.0001 0.0054 
Porto Walter 0.0006 0.4496 -0.0018 0.0444 0.0001 0.0095 
Rio Branco -0.0013 0.1318 0.0019 0.0462 0.0002 0.0144 
Rodrigues Alves 0 0.0012 0 0 0 0.0042 
Santa Rosa do Purus 0 0.0117 0 0 0 0.0089 
Sena Madureira 0.0014 0.0274 -0.0002 0.2923 -0.0001 0.0088 
Senador Guiomard -0.0017 0.5053 -0.0001 0.007 -0.0001 0.0087 
Tarauacá 0.001 0.4021 -0.0001 0 0 0.0145 
Xapuri 0.0011 0.0201 -0.0017 0.0438 -0.0001 0.0113 
Porto Acre 0.001 0.0512 -0.0002 0.0077 -0.0001 0.030 
Source: Authors 
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Table 4: Ranked relative land-use returns under uncertainty (‘Cost’ per ha; lowest first) and mean 
carbon stock by municipality (ranking in parentheses, highest first) 
 
Rank Municipality  Cost (per ha) 
Mean carbon 
density 
 
 
Corn Coffee Pasture (Mg C / ha) 
1 Brasiléia 9.17 8.45 8.46 158.49 (13) 
2 Acrelandia 9.09 8.44 9.19 102.13 (18) 
3 Jordão 9.40 0.00 9.27 188.99 (2) 
4 Cruzeiro do Sul 8.81 7.10 9.43 161.05 (12) 
5 Plácido de Castro 9.34 8.55 9.53 72.13 (21) 
6 Porto Acre 9.41 7.42 9.57 138.40 (14) 
7 Rodrigues Alves 9.39 0.00 9.61 168.12 (10) 
8 Capixaba 9.53 8.24 9.61 98.57 (19) 
9 Marechal 
Thaumaturgo 9.19 7.18 9.64 170.32 (9) 
10 Porto Walter 8.64 7.25 9.72 96.69 (10) 
11 Rio Branco 9.44 8.28 9.74 164.70 (11) 
12 Epitaciolândia 8.83 8.43 9.75 117.95 (16) 
13 Sena Madureira 9.14 7.69 9.76 183.53 (3) 
 
14 Senador Guiomard 8.55 7.69 9.76 
 
171.28 (8) 
15 Mâncio Lima 9.26 7.47 9.83 171.58 (7) 
16 Santa Rosa do 
Purus 9.83 0.00 9.76 128.10 (15) 
17 Assis Brasil 9.72 8.09 9.84 189.24 (1) 
18 Tarauacá 8.66 7.69 9.87 59.99 (22) 
19 Manoel Urbano 9.73 8.08 9.88 178.56 (4) 
20 Feijó 8.71 8.06 9.88 177.01 (5) 
21 Xapuri 9.75 8.07 9.91 175.78 (6) 
22 Bujari 7.69 8.90 9.94 111.29 (17) 
Source: Authors 
Note: Although we use 90% (p = 0.9), there are a number of cases in which the variability of the 
alternative land use (corn, coffee, pasture) was so small that it was numerically challenging to 
identify the fixed REDD+ payment  (see footnote 6) in order to ensure that forest was preferred by 
the landowner exactly 90 times out of 100.    
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APPENDIX 
1. Municipality-scale area and production for pasture/cattle, corn, and coffee, 2006 
Municipality  Coffee Corn Pasture 
  Area 
(ha) 
Production 
(tonnes) 
Area 
(ha) 
Production 
(tonnes) 
Area 
(ha) 
Production 
(head cattle) 
Acrelândia 382 548 1040 5140 23939 178905 
Assis Brasil  37 35 142 525 4692 26398 
Brasiléia   132 144 1538 5700 27308 171864 
Bujari   2 2 890 3080 37519 208766 
Capixabaa   13 11 834 3377 19195 118943 
Cruzeiro do Sul  32 40 1221 2413 10416 42394 
Epitaciolândia  42 21 1190 4410 15088 71324 
Feijó  9 16 921 3415 14912 60600 
Jordão  0 0 284 983 1913 4509 
Mâncio Lima  2 2 180 401 1945 16035 
Manoel Urbano  40 14 162 600 3004 22839 
Marechal Thaumaturgo 6 10 422 1113 847 4957 
Plácido de Castro 62 56 550 2702 28650 163166 
Porto Walter  0 0 194 479 990 4431 
Rio Branco  28 33 524 1944 52926 454728 
Rodrigues Alves  28 35 236 584 3987 11553 
Santa Rosa do Purus  0 0 12 36 730 2189 
Senador Guiomard  65 64 736 3960 38584 257518 
Sena Madureira  150 48 1303 4830 39587 186642 
Tarauacá   0 0 1560 5781 22177 97552 
Xapuri  17 16 579 2145 31546 204163 
Porto Acre  38 36 808 2994 37855 143439 
Source: IBGE (2006) 
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2. Variables used in regressions 
Variable Description Source 
Corn Fertiliser Fertiliser costs per 
hectare for corn 
production per annum 
at the municipality level 
IBGE  
Corn Salary Salary costs per hectare 
for corn production per 
annum at the 
municipality level 
IBGE 
Coffee Fuel Fuel costs per hectare 
for coffee production 
per annum at the 
municipality level  
IBGE 
Coffee Salary Salary costs per hectare 
for coffee production 
per annum at the 
municipality level 
IBGE 
Coffee Fertiliser Fertiliser costs per 
hectare for coffee 
production per annum 
at the municipality level 
IBGE 
Coffee Total Total costs per hectare 
for coffee production 
per annum at the 
municipality level 
IBGE 
Coffee Yield Yield in tonnes per 
hectare of coffee 
production per annum 
at the municipality level 
IBGE 
Coffee Yield squared Yield in tonnes per 
hectare of coffee 
production per annum 
at the municipality level 
squared 
IBGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
30 
 
3. Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Corn 
Fertiliser 
Coffee 
Fuel 
Coffee Fertiliser Coffee 
Salary 
Coffee 
Total 
      
Corn Salary 1.7096*** 
(0.13203) 
    
      
Coffee Yield  0.0005346*** 
(0.000184) 
   
 
Coffee Yield-
squared 
 -1.54e-08*** 
(5.53e-09) 
   
      
      
Coffee Fuel   0.1473*** 
(0.01884) 
1.1895*** 
(0.04618) 
10.489*** 
(0.5866) 
Constant -0.00699 
(0.2576) 
0.2849 
(0.2534) 
-0.01154 
(0.02746) 
-0.0363 
(0.05306) 
-2.3230 
(1.2678) 
      
Observations 302 86 76 64 76 
Source: Authors 
 
